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The Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand has gone through 
four major phases of reform: 1966-74, laying the foundation for individual lending to farmers 
through joint liability groups; 1975-87, expanding its lending operations through access to 
commercial bank and donor funds and consolidating its operations by reducing loan channeling 
through cooperatives; 1988-96, striving for viability and self-reliance, under conditions of 
controlled interest rates, through savings mobilization, improved loan recovery and increased 
staff productivity; since 1997, adjusting to prudential regulation by the central bank and 
diversifying into non-agricultural lending. The result of gradual reform has been the largest 
outreach by any Agricultural Development Bank: 88% of farm households in Thailand, combined 




   
OUTREACH 1999 (March 2000)     
Lending outreach     
Number of registered borrowers  5.0 million   
% of farm households in Thailand  88%   
Loans outstanding  US$ 5.7 billion   
Average loan size (farmer clients)  US$ 2,042   
Savings outreach     
Number of deposits by individuals  8.3 million   
Deposit volume (incl. Institutional)  US$ 4.5 billion   
Average deposit size  US$ 246   
Market share in rural deposits  15%   
     
SUSTAINABILITY FY 1999     
Capital adequacy  (Capital/Net loans)  9.1% 
Portfolio quality  (Past dues/Loans outstanding)  16.5% 
Operational self-sustainability  (Income/Operational cost)  228% 
Financial self-sustainability  (Income/Operational cost and Cost of funds)  98% 
Self-sufficiency in funds  (Deposit to loans ratio)  81% 
Efficiency  (Administrative cost/Average loans outstanding)  2.8% 






The Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) of Thailand was established in 
1966 as a government owned agricultural development bank. The mandate of the bank has 
been to provide agricultural credit to farm households.  
 
BAAC is recognized as one of the few successful examples of specialized agricultural 
development banks in Asia and the developing world as a whole.
1 The success of BAAC is 
founded on the achievement of the dual objectives of (a) maximum outreach to millions of 
farm households as its target clientele and, at the same time, (b) maintaining its financial 
viability and the sustainability of its operations and services.  
 
In the 33 years of operations, BAAC has gone through a process of reform and gradual 
transformation from a specialized agricultural lending institution to a diversified rural bank 
which provides a range of financial services. While this process is still on-going and the 
transition far from being completed, important lessons can be learned from BAAC’s reform 
experience.  
 
The objective of this case study is to analyze the reform process of BAAC, the major 
elements contents as well as the phasing of reform, and to draw lessons and distill best 
practices which may be useful for the reform of agricultural banks elsewhere. Therefore, 
Chapter II first provides an overview of the reform process in BAAC and depicts the main 
reform steps in each phase. Chapter III analyses the contents and elements of the reform 
from a functional perspective and specifically concentrates on six areas of reform. Chapter IV 
summarizes the main conclusions and lessons learned. 
 
                                                                 
1  For example, BAAC was praised by the World Bank as one of the few successful rural financial institutions 
(Yaron 1992).    
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE REFORM PROCESS IN BAAC  
 
The reform of BAAC must be seen as a process which unfolded in stages over more than 30 
years. Major policies, events and personalities (BAAC presidents) have greatly influenced 
BAAC’s development and reform process which are presented here in four phases
2.  
 
Phase I (1966 - 1974): Laying the foundation 
The Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives was established by an Act of the 
Parliament to replace the former Bank for Cooperatives and began operating in November 
1966. BAAC’s foundation phase was strongly determined by the leadership of the first 
charismatic president. Incorporating lessons learned from the former bank in the 
organizational design and instilling training and discipline in BAAC’s operations laid the sound 
financial basis for the bank in his term.  
 
Design of credit technology 
 
During the initial phase, lending to agricultural cooperatives constituted the core business of 
the new bank, a heritage from BAAC’s predecessor, the Bank for Cooperatives. In addition, 
the policy was greatly influenced by the president who had formerly been a cooperative officer 
with the agriculture ministry. At the same time, however, BAAC under the guidance of the 
president developed a new credit technology, the joint liability group mechanism, which later 
was to become a key factor for the success of BAAC and the trade-mark of its lending 
operations. Client farmers were asked to form small informal groups which served to 
guarantee the individual farmer’s loans from BAAC. This eliminated the collateral problem 
since many farmers did not have the legal documents showing proof of land ownership. 
 
Constraints and problems 
 
At the end of the first phase, BAAC faced a number of problems similar to other agricultural 
development banks at the time. First, BAAC depended almost exclusively on capital infusions 
from the government for operating funds. Allocations often came late and the ebbs and flows 
of government funds were difficult to synchronize with the seasonal credit needs of farmers. 
The result was a chronic fund shortage. Second, loan recovery rates dropped to as low as 
51% in the early 1970s. The performance of agricultural cooperatives was particularly bad. 
Third, administrative costs had increased to more than 8% in 1974 imposing a serious threat 
to the financial viability of the bank.  
 
Phase II (1975 - 1987): Consolidation and strengthening of lending operations 
 
Access to commercial bank deposits and donor funds 
 
In 1975, the Bank o f Thailand (BoT) issued an agricultural credit policy by which the 
commercial banks were mandated to lend 5% of their deposits
3 to the agricultural sector. 
Over the following ten-year period, the credit quota was successively increased to 20% which 
is applicable until today. Commercial banks could lend the amount directly to farmers or were 
obliged to deposit with BAAC any portion of the quota they could not disburse directly. The 
policy marked a turning point in BAAC’s operations and the increasing availability of 
                                                                 
2  Drawn partly on Sacay et al. (1996), Chapter III 
3  In the first year (1975), the the quota was based on commercial banks’ total loans outstanding. The base 
was changed to total deposits from 1976 onwards.  
3 
commercial bank deposits alleviated the shortage of funds. In addition, from 1975 onwards, 
foreign funding sources were tapped from international finance and donor agencies, such as 
OECF, USAID, the World Bank, IFAD and ADB.  
 
Shift from wholesale to retail lending 
 
The recovery problems experienced in lending to agricultural cooperatives on the one hand, 
and the initial success of the joint liability mechanism in direct lending to farmer clients on the 
other hand led to a decisive shift in the lending policy: from wholesale lending to cooperatives 
the bank to retail lending to individual farmers organized in joint liability groups. At the end of 
the second phase, the bank had formed about 100,000 joint liability groups with 1.5 million 
members throughout the country, compared to 821 agricultural cooperatives.    
 
Increasing efficiency and reducing cost 
 
The shift from wholesale to retail lending resulted in higher administrative cost and forced the 
bank to increase efficiency. A key factor in this regard were staff productivity standards which 
were developed in this phase. Moreover, the computerization program commenced in 1983 
which led to considerable gains in efficiency and productivity in the branch offices and field 
units.  
 
Phase III (1988 - 1996): Rapid growth, outreach expansion and diversification 
 
The third phase has been the most important phase of reform for BAAC. A number of 
changes, decisions and reform measures initiated a fundamental transformation of BAAC 
from an agricultural lending institution to a universal rural bank. 
 
Financial sector reforms 
 
Financial policy reforms in Thailand began in 1989 when the BoT eliminated the interest rate 
ceilings on fixed deposits (one-year and over) of commercial banks. In 1992, all interest rates 
were liberalized. The financial reforms also gradually removed restrictions on branch opening 
and liberalized the scope of the agricultural credit allocation policy for commercial banks to 
include all other kinds of credit in the rural areas. This shift from an agricultural to a rural credit 
quota latter was of particular importance to BAAC as the commercial banks expanded their 
rural lending portfolios and, as a consequence, reduced their deposits with BAAC 
dramatically. 
 
In response to these policy changes, BAAC geared itself towards a more competitive 
environment and undertook strategic adjustments in its operations in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. The bank’s management defined strategies on outreach expansion, savings 
mobilization and overall efficiency improvement. 
 
Expansion of branch network to maximum outreach 
 
In the third phase, BAAC embarked on an aggressive expansion of the branch network and a 
decentralization of operations. Within ten years, the number of branches was raised from 82 
to 535, the number of field offices from 582 to 875. Through this measure, the outreach to its 
target clientele, i.e. farm households, was expanded to the maximum, comprising about 85% 








In the late 1980s, BAAC recognized the importance of savings mobilization which became a 
core activity and key factor for the evaluation of branch performance. The liberalization of the 
agricultural credit policy and the withdrawal of commercial banks’ deposits further accelerated 
these efforts. During the third phase, rural deposits grew to be become the main source of 
funds accounting for about two thirds of BAAC’s operating fund.  
 
Improving loan recovery 
 
Major efforts were directed at improving loan recovery. The recovery rate had been lifted from 
the very low levels of the 1970s but it was still unsatisfactory throughout the 1980s. It was only 
during the third phase that the portfolio quality significantly improved. This development was 
particularly important with regard to savings mobilization with the quality of loans as an 
essential guarantee for the safety of deposits.    
 
Increasing productivity to maintain financial viability 
 
As BAAC’s lending rates remained politically controlled and the spread extremely limited, the 
management continuously emphasized efficiency and staff productivity. Operational cost was 
reduced to almost 4% of loans outstanding in the mid-1990s, close to the level of commercial 
banks which operate with higher loan sizes and fewer customers. Staff productivity was 
maintained at high levels in terms of number of clients and tripled in terms of volume. The 
continuous increase in efficiency and productivity were key factors for BAAC in maintaining its 
financial viability.  
 
Phase IV (since 1997): The effects of the financial crisis and the reform agenda ahead 
 
The severe financial and economic crisis which unfolded after the floating of the Thai 
currency in July 1997 marked another milestone in BAAC’s development and reform process. 
The crisis has particularly affected the banking system with about half of all loans outstanding 
being classified as non-performing and the problems are far from being solved. The crisis has 
exposed BAAC to major challenges, but has also brought opportunities.   
 
Losses from the devaluation of the Thai currency 
 
The devaluation of the Baht had an immediate impact on BAAC. As the bulk of BAAC’s foreign 
borrowings were not secured against exchange rate risks, the revaluation of the foreign debt 
wiped out almost half of BAAC‘s equity capital at the end of FY 1997. In 1998, the equity was 
replenished by a massive capital infusion from the government and capital adequacy was 
restored. 
 
Rise in non-performing loans  
 
Already before the outbreak of the crisis, BAAC’s loan recovery has started to deteriorate. 
This trend was accelerated by the general downturn in economic activity and by the spreading 
incentive problems (moral hazard) caused by the huge amount of non-performing loans in the 
banking system and the general bail-out provided by the government. At the end of the 1990s, 
BAAC is saddled with a severe recovery problem which requires utmost attention and swift 






Safe haven for depositors 
 
In the aftermath of the crisis, BAAC has experienced a tremendous inflow of deposits from 
investors who regard BAAC as a safe haven in the wake of considerable instability of the 
private banking system. These deposits provide an opportunity on the one hand as a source 
of funds, on the other hand, they create a challenge for BAAC with regard to safeguarding and 
maintaining the investors’ confidence in the safety of their deposits. They may also expose 
BAAC to liquidity risk as investors may suddenly withdraw these predominantly large-scale 
deposits as soon as the situation in the private commercial banks ameliorates. 
 
Prudential regulation and supervision 
 
In October 1998, BAAC came under the banking supervision of the Bank of Thailand (BoT). 
With this change, the bank has become subject to prudential regulation, such as capital 
adequacy and loan loss provisioning. More stringent rules and performance standards may 
be painful in the short term but they will help BAAC in its struggle for financial viability and self-
sustainability in the long run. Furthermore, the BoT’s supervisory f unction will strengthen 
BAAC’s bargaining power in negotiations with the government and politicians in protecting its 
financial health and warding off interventions with negative effects on its financial 
performance. 
 
Diversification into non-farm lending 
 
Another opportunity from the crisis has been the recent amendment of the BAAC Act finally 
allowing the bank to expand its lending operations to non-farm activities, an objective the bank 
has fought for many years. High unemployment and the return of migrant workers to their 
villages have induced the government to promote self-employment and entrepreneurship in 
rural areas where BAAC is expected to play a major role. The non-farm window has set the 
pace for further growth of BAAC which has already reached a saturation point with regard to 
agricultural lending and will foster BAAC’s transition from a specialized agricultural lending 




III.  FUNCTIONAL AREAS OF REFORM 
1. Government ownership and the r esulting governance structure: a permanent 
challenge for BAAC to safeguard operational autonomy 
1.1  Government ownership and future privatization  
 
BAAC was established in 1966 as a government-owned specialized bank to provide credit to 
agricultural producers. Until today, ownership has largely remained with the government. More 
than 99% of the shares are held by the Ministry of Finance and the remaining balance mainly 
by agricultural cooperatives. Since 1998, BAAC has been permitted to sell shares to its 
employees and to its clients in general. Some shares have been acquired by BAAC staff and 
employees. However, before going public on a wider scale, BAAC must adhere to certain 
regulations and procedures stipulated by the security market authorities, e.g. due diligence. 
Furthermore, BAAC is still working on an internal computerized system for the sale of shares 
and the registration of shareholders throughout the country. Privatization is to start as soon as 
these issues have been solved. 
 
1.2  Governance structure 
 
BAAC is governed by a Board of Directors with eleven members. The Board controls the 
policies and business operations of the bank. The composition of the Board is outlined in the 
Act of 1966 to include representatives of the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Cooperative Promotion Department, the Agricultural 
Land Reform Office and the Bank of Thailand. The president of BAAC is an ex-officio member 
of the Board. The Deputy Finance Minister acts as the chairman of the Board. Overall, the 
Board has been comprised mainly of public officials representing the interests of the 
government while expertise and experience in banking and financial business has been 
scarce.  
 
The Board composition has several important implications. Firstly, it implies a primarily short-
term agenda which at times may conflict with the long-term objective of financial health and 
sustainability of the institution. Secondly, major internal policies are based on political 
considerations rather than financial business principles, e.g. the setting of lending rates and 
the restriction of BAAC’s lending operations to agriculture only. Thirdly, due to its highly 
political status as the major agriculture arm of the government, BAAC has to accommodate 
the particular interests of ministries and government agencies by implementing a 
considerable number of „special projects“ in addition to its regular lending operations.  
 
Such politically motivated restrictions and interventions frequently  have had a detrimental 
impact on the financial viability of the bank. As a response, BAAC has adopted a strategy of 
„interventions against compensations“ through intensive lobbying and dialogue („coffee shop 
talks“) with the government and members of parliament. In most instances, the BAAC 
management has been successful in negotiating restrictive policy directives against 
preferential treatment and access to subsidies to mitigate or neutralize the effects on the 
financial sustainability (see chapter below for details). However, in few cases BAAC was 
forced to accept government interventions without compensations. A severe case occurred 
recently when the government which came into power in 1995 forced BAAC to reduce its 
lending rate for small loans under Baht 60,000 (US$ 2,400) to below cost-covering levels. 
More than a third of BAAC’s loan portfolio was affected at the time. 
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1.3  Operational autonomy 
   
Government interventions were mainly confined to the policy level while the operational level 
was kept free from interventions, thereby ensuring a high degree of operational autonomy. 
BAAC has managed to ward off pressures from political interest groups and to resist 
interference from local government in borrower selection and lending decisions. Unlike other 
governments in South Asian countries, the Thai government has restrained from politically 
motivated loan waivers and debt forgiveness programs. In 1998, the government backed and 
supported BAAC in its rejection of a „debt moratorium“ demanded by farmers’ organizations 
who - inspired by political interest groups - staged several weeks of demonstrations and 
rallies.  
 
1.4  From government control to prudential regulation and supervision 
 
Until recently, BAAC has operated under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance unlike other 
banks which are supervised by the Bank of Thailand (BoT). The annual external audit was 
performed by the Office of the Auditor General of Thailand, a government agency. Also, 
BAAC’s performance has been assessed by the Thai Rating and Information Service (TRIS), 
a framework designed for state-owned enterprises. 
 
In the wake of the financial crisis, an important change occurred in October 1998 when the 
government decided to place BAAC under the prudential regulation and supervision of the 
BoT. In the first place, not everyone in BAAC was particularly happy about this move as the 
bank is now subject to more stringent rules and regulations, for example on capital adequacy, 
on classification of loans and loan loss provisioning. Prudential regulations and banking 
standards in line with international standards set out in the Basle Agreement are currently 
being developed by the BoT with assistance from the IMF and the World Bank. However, the 
shift represents a major reform step from which BAAC will benefit in the long run. With the 




2. Organization and management: expansion and decentralization towards maximum 
client outreach 
2.1  Decentralization of operations 
 
BAAC carries out its operations through a four-tier organizational structure: the field offices, 
the branches, the provincial offices and the head office. The field offices represent BAAC's 
most important outreach unit covering all districts of the country. Each field office employs 
eight to nine credit officers who are responsible for screening and selecting borrowers, 
appraising loans and monitoring repayment. Field offices are not involved in cash transactions 
and, thus, do not have facilities for disbursing loans or for collecting debt repayments and 
mobilizing deposits. These functions are assumed by the branch to which the respective field 
office is affiliated.  
 
Over the years, management and decision-making have been successively decentralized. 
The branch managers have far-reaching authority. They can approve loans of up to Baht 
500,000 (US$ 12,500). As 98% of all loans extended by BAAC are generally below this 
ceiling
4, lending decisions are almost completely in the hands of the branch managers. 
                                                                 
4  Ref. Table  below.  
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In 1997, provincial offices - with a senior manager acting as provincial director - were created 
in an effort to decentralize management control, monitoring and supervision. A provincial 
director guides and supervises between 6 and 10 branches, depending on the size of the 
respective province. The provincial directors, in turn, report to the head office in Bangkok. 
 
2.2  Expansion of the branch network 
 
A major factor for BAAC’s success in client outreach was the massive expansion of the retail 
network over the past decade. For twenty years, BAAC had maintained only one branch office 
in each of the country's 76 provinces, with 7 to 9 affiliated field offices doing the groundwork 
for the lending operations. For loan disbursement and repayment farmer clients had to travel 
to the BAAC branch office in the provincial capital. For most of the farmers the distance and 
the transaction costs involved were considerable, for many prohibitive.  
 
In 1988, BAAC’s management took the major decision to decentralize and down-scale its 
banking operations from the provincial to the district level and issued a policy of upgrading 10 
to 25 field offices into sub-branches and - ultimately - full branches every year. Since then, the 
number of branches has increased by a factor of eight. At the same time, additional field 
offices were opened. Today, BAAC has a dense and highly decentralized network of 586 
branches and 887 field offices reaching out to the villages (see Table 1 below).  
 
Table 1:  Expansion of retail network 
 
End of Fiscal year  1966  1975  1986  1990  1994  1999 
             
Provincial offices  --  --  --  --  --  72 
Branches and Sub-branches  15  58  70  168  304  586 
Field Offices  n.a.  n.a.  582  615  804  887 
             
No. Of staff at branches and field 
offices 
266  2,248  5,230  6,845  9,899  13,08
2 
    Source: BAAC 
 
 
The physical expansion was accompanied by a considerable increase in human resources. 
The number of staff more than doubled from 5,230 in 1986 to 13082 in 1999. Simultaneously, 
all the branches and most of the field offices were computerized, thus raising productivity and 
efficiency levels. This allowed BAAC to serve an even larger number of clients. 
 
 
2.3  Branches as profit centers  
 
The BAAC branches have been organized as profit centers. This has ensured a high degree 
of accountability and responsibility among branch managers and branch staff. Profitability - 
expressed by return on assets (ROA) - has become the single most important criteria for 
performance assessment and evaluation. 
 
In 1997, BAAC introduced the transfer price mechanism. The transfer price is the internal 
interest rate applied on funds transferred between the branches and the head office. When a 
branch requires funds for its lending operations, it can borrow from the head office and is 
charged with the transfer price, and vice versa, when a branch has been active in savings 
mobilization and has excess funds, it can deposit these funds with the head office and is  
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credited with the transfer price. In principle, the transfer price is set by the management in 
accordance with market cost of funds but it can also be used as an important policy 
instrument. 
 
In the initial period, the transfer price was set by the management at a relatively high level 
above the interest rate for fixed deposits, thus making savings mobilization much more 
attractive than borrowing from the head office. This policy gave a boost to savings 
mobilization. In the present situation of excess liquidity, the transfer price has been reduced 
accordingly. 
 
However, the profit center concept as it is implemented by BAAC at present still has some 
shortcomings as not all cost items are fully and timely accounted for by the branches. One 
example is the loan loss provisions. At year end, the branch accountant calculates a tentative 
loan loss provision for management accounting purposes but it is not posted in the general 
ledger as an expense. Hence, branch profits are overstated and loose some of their function 
as precise and early signaling device for branch managers. BAAC is currently working on a 
system to eliminate this shortcoming by the end of 1999. 
  
2.4  Management Information System (MIS) 
 
BAAC’s management information system has not followed suit with the rapid development 
and fundamental changes that occurred in recent years. The MIS is centralized and geared 
towards the middle and top management in the head office. Accordingly, at the branch level 
MIS is largely perceived as a system of reporting to head office. As a matter of fact, every 
month branch staff have to prepare more than one hundred reports to different departments in 
the head office, many of them reportedly overlapping and duplicative. The system has major 
weaknesses in providing appropriate and timely management information to the managers at 
the operational level, including the branch managers, the field unit chiefs and, ultimately, the 
credit officers as portfolio managers.  
 
Another major problem is that the computer systems and programs are „home-grown“ with 
new modules added continuously. BAAC has decided to revamp the entire system and to 
design and install a new system from scratch. This encompasses both sub-systems of a 
modern financial institution’s MIS, i.e. the financial management information system (FMIS) 
and the customer information system (CIS). At present, BAAC does not have an integrated 
customer information system which combines all data on loans, deposits and other 
transactions of a particular client in one file. At present, the portfolio system is handled by the 
credit chief and is limited to borrower clients while depositors are recorded by the tellers in a 
separate system. One of the consequences is, for example, that credit officers have no 
access to information about the savings performance of their borrower clients. 
 
The system has functioned fairly ten years ago when BAAC was primarily a lending institution 
with a limited number of 70 branches. In the meantime, however, BAAC has expanded its 
scale and scope considerably, decentralized its operations and designated hundreds of 
managers all of whom require precise and timely management information in an adequate 
form. The bank must swiftly develop an improved MIS which reflects the changes and takes 




3. The credit delivery mechanism: from wholesale to retail lending 
3.1  BAAC’s successful credit technology: Joint liability groups 
 
The development of the Joint Liability Group concept dates back to the foundation of BAAC in 
1966. Because few Thai farmers had land title documents to use as collateral in the 1960s, 
BAAC adopted joint liability as principal form of security for small loans. Joint liability has been 
at the heart of the BAAC’s lending ever since. 
 
The joint liability groups are self-formed by people who know and trust each other, and vary in 
size from a minimum of 5 to a maximum of 30 and an average of about 15 members. More 
than one group may be formed in a village. Generally, the JLGs cannot be compared to self-
help groups known from other contexts in terms of activities, organization and administration. 
The groups’ organization is simple with only a group leader elected among the members who 
acts as the liaison person to the BAAC credit officer. The groups have no names, only BAAC 
registration numbers. There is no group fund and no financial transactions within the group 
and, hence, no financial administration. Therefore, the groups do not function as financial 
intermediaries. 
 
Individual loans up to Baht 100,000 are granted on the basis of joint liability with the limitation, 
however, that BAAC does not loan out more than 60% of the annual income of farmers. 
Loans beyond Baht 100,000 must be secured by tangible collateral, usually through mortgage 
of land and buildings.  
 
All transactions are conducted between BAAC and the individual members, also the group 
leader has no role in disbursements or recovery of cash amounts. The groups help BAAC in 
borrower screening, loan appraisal and verification of data about loan applicants. Peer 
pressure is activated at the time of loan repayment as fresh loans are only available to 
individual borrowers when  all members of his/her have repaid. The group leader is 
responsible for distributing repayment notes and reminding the members of their obligations. 
 
3.2  Marked shift from wholesale to retail lending 
 
The initial success of direct lending to farmer clients organized in small joint liability groups on 
the one hand and the problems experienced in lending to agricultural cooperatives on the 
other hand led to a shift in the lending policy during the second phase (1975 to 1987). BAAC 
decided to embark primarily on retail lending to farmer clients. From the foundation of BAAC 
until today, the share of wholesale lending through cooperatives and farmers’ associations 
dropped from 70% to only 7%, as illustrated in Table below. Direct lending to farmer clients 
organized in JLGs has therefore become the mainstream lending program.  
 
 
Table 2:  Allocation of loans to farmer clients (retail) and farmers’ 
organizations/intermediaries (wholesale) 
 
  1967  1975  1987  1994  1999 
Direct farmer clients (JLG)  30%  55%  86%  92%  93% 
Cooperatives and Farmers’ Associations  70%  45%  14%  8%  7% 




The major expansion, however, occurred during the third phase (1988 to 1996). The major 
factor behind this development has been the rapid extension of  the  retail branch network 
during the same period. Within a period of ten years, the number of groups and members 
more than doubled while the loan portfolio increased eight-fold (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3:  Joint  Liability Groups and Members 
 
Year  No. of JLGs 
(estimates) 




1986  96,000  1.5    21.9  
1987  107,000  1.6    21.5  
1988  113,000  1.7    24.0  
1989  126,000  1.9    29.7  
1990  140,000  2.1   36.9 
1991  150,000  2.3   47.8 
1992  170,000  2.6   66.1 
1993  180,000  2.9   85.6 
1994  206,000  3.1   97.7 
1995  220,000  3.3  127.2 
1996  228,000  3.4  162.6 
1997  228,000  3.4  177.5 
1998  228,000  3.4  192.8 
1999  233,000  3.5  212.8 
                Source: BAAC 
 
 
From 1992 to 1996, BAAC tested another model of wholesale banking through financial 
intermediaries. In the framework of an Asian-wide program of linking banks and self-help 
groups promoted by APRACA with technical support from GTZ of Germany, BAAC 
experimented with linking informal self-help groups to its banking services. The self-help 
groups consisted of the so-called Production Credit Groups (PCG) promoted by the 
Community Development Department of the Ministry of Interior and Farm Women Groups 
(FWG). These groups - being primarily savings associations - were expected to function as 
financial intermediaries by borrowing wholesale from BAAC and lending retail to their 
members. The experiment yielded disappointing results due to a number of reasons.
5 First, 
the majority of the groups had limited skills in financial management and showed little interest 
in acting as financial intermediaries. Second,  the system of training and guidance by the 
promoting institutions had inherent weaknesses. Third, the groups were not interested in 
borrowing from BAAC, partly because most of the members resp. their husbands were 
simultaneously members of BAAC joint liability groups and already registered as BAAC 
borrowers. As a consequence, the experiment was phased out and finally terminated in 1996. 
4. Financial policies and products: from agricultural credit to rural financial services 
 
4.1 Credit services 
 
Categories of credit services 
 
BAAC credit services can be divided into two broad categories according to the delivery 
channels outlined in the previous section:  
•  retail credit to individual farmers (organized in joint liability groups) accounting for 92% of 
the portfolio 
                                                                 
5  For details see Maurer (1997)  
12 
•  wholesale credit to farmer institutions (agricultural cooperatives and farmer associations) 
accounting for 8% of the portfolio 
 
Retail credit to individual farmers is again broken down into  
•  normal lending which accounted for 91% in 1998 
•  special project lending which accounted for 9% in 1998 
  
Therefore, normal lending to individual client farmers represents the mainstream credit 
program of BAAC accounting for about 84% of the total loan portfolio in 1998. The following 
analysis is thus focused on this mainstream program. 
 
Types of loans  
 
BAAC provides three types of loans to individual client farmers for agricultural production: 
•  short-term loans for working capital in agricultural production, for postponement of sale of 
farm produce (paddy pledging scheme) and as immediate cash credit; 
•  medium-term loans for smaller investment in agricultural working tools and for livestock; 
•  long-term loans for larger investment in fixed agricultural assets. 
 
For almost 30 years, BAAC had been restricted in its lending policy which was exclusively 
confined to agricultural production. Only in 1993, the bank was given the permission to extend 
loans also for farm-related activities, such as agro-processing and marketing, up to a 
maximum of 20% of its portfolio. Farm-related lending started in 1994 and has increased to 
about 7% of the portfolio. 
 
Table 4:  Types of loans and share of portfolio 
 
Type of loan  Share in loan portfolio  
to individual client farmers  
(1999) 
I. Agricultural production  93% 
•  Short-term (6 to 18 months)  40% 
•  medium-term (3 years)  20% 
•  long-term (15 years)  33% 
   
II. Farm-related activities  7% 
 
 
In the initial years, loans were predominantly short-term because resources were inadequate 
and the demand for farm loans was mostly for seasonal cropping needs. A major factor 
behind the steady growth in the volume of long-term loans has been the availability of long-
term foreign funds since the early 1980s.
6 Today, BAAC’s loan portfolio is rather evenly 
spread with a significant proportion of medium- and long-term loans.  
 
Lending interest rates   
 
BAAC’s lending rates have been positive in real terms except in 1980 and 1981 when inflation 
soared to almost 20%. Since then, inflation came down to below 5% and over the past five 
years has moved in a narrow span between 5% and 6%. 
 
BAAC’s lending rates are set and periodically adjusted by the Board taking into account the 
blended cost of funds and operating expenses. However, political considerations have also 
had a bearing on determining the level and the structure of lending rates. As a matter of 
                                                                 
6  See Sacay et al. (1996), p.24.  
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principle, the BAAC Board has kept the interest rates at one or two percentage points lower 
than commercial bank rates. This policy ensured that BAAC interest rates moved with the 
market.  
Table 5:  Interest rates on loans to client farmers (March 1998) 
 
Loan size  Interest rate 
below Baht 60,000  11.5% 
Baht 60,000 - 150,000  12.5% 
Baht 150,000 - 300,000  13.5% 
Baht 300,000 - 500,000  14.5% 
Baht 500,000 - 1,000,000  15.5% 
Baht 1,000,000 - 5,000,000  16.5% 
more than Baht 5,000,000  17.0% 
   
weighted average (1998)  13.4% 
 
 
The structure of interest rates according to loan sizes, however, is primarily based on political 
grounds. As illustrated in Table 5, loans are priced progressively: the larger the amount, the 
higher the interest rate. The rationale behind this is an intended distribution effect through 
cross-subsidization of small borrowers by larger borrowers. The lending rates apply to all 
types of loans, irrespective of the purpose and term of the loan. However, in August 1999, the 
Board decided to introduce a lending rate structure based on loan quality rather than loan 
size. Clients are subject to AAA, AA and A and B rating based on their respective past 
repayment records. The minimum lending rate is charged to the least risky client in AAA 




Loan recovery is closely monitored and is one of the key indicators for assessing branch 
performance. BAAC uses two ratios for measuring recovery performance, the annual 
recovery rate and the past due ratio. The recovery rate is defined as the proportion of total 
collection during a given year to total loans matured. The past due ratio is measured as the 
proportion of loan principal in arrears in a given year to total loans outstanding. BAAC’s 
monitoring and reporting have also emphasized the aging of arrears which serves as the 
basis for provisioning.   
 
In the early years, BAAC faced considerable problems with recovery of loans in the early 
1970s. Repayment discipline and performance was particularly weak among agricultural 
cooperatives which at the t ime absorbed the lion share of BAAC’s loans. Individual client 
farmers who were organized in joint liability groups fared much better in repayment. This 
pattern has remained the same until today: For most of the past decade, the recovery rate on 
loans to individual client farmers was around 85% compared to less than 70% on loans to 
agricultural cooperatives, as illustrated in Table 6 below.  
 
Since the mid-1980s, BAAC has strongly emphasized loan recovery and, as a result, the 
performance improved considerably from 1986 to 1992 when the repayment rate
7 of individual 
client farmers almost reached 90%. In this period, BAAC has effectively institutionalized a 
system of strictly enforcing loan repayment discipline. In this context, the joint liability 
mechanism  has been a key factor. For seasonal loans, the bank has insisted that all 
members of a joint liability group must fully repay their loans before any one member of the 
same group may obtain a new loan. This principle which has been consistently implemented 
                                                                 
7  The repayment rate is defined as the ratio of loan principal repaid to loan principal matured during the year. 
The past-due ratio is defined as loan amount in arrears to loans outstanding.  
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has activated peer pressure among the members. There have been reports that BAAC clients 
resort to short-term borrowing from informal lenders in order to pay their BAAC loans on 
schedule.  
 
Table 6:  Recovery performance 1986 to 1998 
 






1986  74%  45%  69% 
1987  75%  49%  71% 
1988  77%  57%  74% 
1989  84%  69%  82% 
1990  85%  67%  82% 
1991  88%  68%  84% 
1992  89%  69%  86% 
1993  89%  68%  84% 
1994  88%  68%  86% 
1995  86%  70%  85% 
1996  87%  69%  86% 
1997  83%  62%  81% 
1998  75%  60%  74% 
1999  75%  59%  74% 
Source: BAAC Annual Reports 
 
 
In alternate of the crisis, the recovery performance has successfully deteriorated and 
experienced a dramatic decline to 75% in 1998 and 1999, the lowest level in more than 10 
years. In 1998, the past due ratio reached more than 16%. A considerable proportion of 
almost 10% are past due by more than one year, the highest share since more than a decade 
(see Table 7).  
 
Table 7:  Past due ratios and aging structure of loans to individual client farmers 
 
Year  Total   One year  2 to 5 years  over 5 years 
1986  15.9%  5.6%  8.6%  1.7% 
1987  21.8%  12.9%  7.3%  1.6% 
1988  16.3%  8.8%  5.9%  1.5% 
1989  11.4%  5.8%  4.4%  1.3% 
1990  11.6%  7.5%  2.9%  1.2% 
1991  9.2%  6.1%  2.1%  1.0% 
1992  7.5%  5.2%  1.6%  0.8% 
1993  9.2%  7.0%  1.6%  0.7% 
1994  8.1%  6.1%  1.5%  0.5% 
1995  8.5%  6.6%  1.6%  0.3% 
1996  7.5%  4.4%  2.8%  0.4% 
1997  10.9%  6.8%  3.8%  0.4% 
1998  16.2%  9.0%  6.7%  0.5% 
1999  16.5%  6.2%  9.5%  0.6% 
               Source: BAAC 
 
 
The effects of the financial and e conomic crisis unfolding in 1997 and 1998 have been a 
major factor behind this deterioration. In the view of the general situation of the commercial 
banking system with about 48% of the entire loans being classified as non-performing loans 
(NPL), BAAC has  been able to maintain a comparatively favorable position. The large  
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proportion of so-called „strategic NPL“ - with large and prominent borrowers being rather 
unwilling than unable to repay - has created moral hazard and incentive problems which have 
increasingly undermined the general repayment discipline, also among BAAC clients. BAAC’s 
current recovery problem is a serious one and the management is aware that it needs to be 
urgently addressed. 
 
In the past, BAAC has managed to ultimately recover most of the loans, even those with past 
dues of several years. Loans are kept in the books and are followed up for up to ten years. 
For most of the past decade, the loan loss ratio  - i.e. loans written off to average loans 
outstanding  - has been around 0.1%. Only i n 1998, the year of crisis, the loan loss ratio 
jumped to 0.7%. However, since BAAC has recently come under the regulation and 
supervision of the Bank of Thailand, more stringent rules on provisioning and write-offs will 




For many years, BAAC has struggled for an amendment of the 1966 Act and to obtain 
permission to expand its lending operations to non-farm activities in rural areas. In 1993, a 
first window was opened when BAAC was allowed to provide loans for farm-related activities 
with refinance from the Asian Development Bank. In 1997, a small grant of Baht 10 million 
was provided by GTZ of Germany under its technical cooperation with BAAC for setting up a 
revolving credit fund for non-farm lending. At the time, BAAC was not allowed to use own 
funds for this purpose. The objectives were (a) to develop a system and procedures for non-
farm lending and conduct a pilot-test in selected branches and (b) to produce a show-case 
for supporting BAAC in its policy dialogue with the government. Finally, in January 1999, the 
cabinet and the parliament approved the amendment of the BAAC Act and allowed the 
expansion of lending operations into non-farm activities up to the extent of 20% of the total 
portfolio. This decision has further widened the scope for the transformation of BAAC from an 
agricultural lending institution to a universal rural bank. BAAC is presently finalizing the 
systems and procedures for nation-wide implementation, drawing from the lessons learned 
from the pilot test.      
 
Special projects: a heritage from supply-leading finance 
 
In addition to its normal lending business, BAAC carries out a large number of special 
agricultural development projects and policy lending programs. In 1998, there were around 
200 special projects and programs, some nationwide, some of them regionally concentrated. 
The outstanding loan volume in 1998 accounted for  9% of total loan portfolio. However, the 
workload associated with these special projects is tremendous. Branch staff and credit 
officers complain that special projects consume more the bulk of their time while they 
account for less than 10% of the portfolio.
8 This has distracted the attention of the credit 
officers from their mainstream lending activities which in the current situation of low recovery 
requires full concentration. In addition, most special lending programs supported by 
government departments carry preferential interest rates which has occasionally led to some 
confusion among the clients. BAAC is compensated by the government in the form of fees 
and interest compensation. A rationalization and reduction in these special projects and 
programs would be urgently required.  
 
4.2  Deposits 
 
During the first twenty years of operations, BAAC concentrated almost exclusively on credit 
services while savings largely remained  - like in many agricultural development banks 
                                                                 
8  Personal interviews with branch staff in the Northeastern Region in 1999.  
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elsewhere - the „forgotten half“ of rural finance. During the early years, BAAC implemented a 
compulsory savings scheme for borrowers, requiring that each borrower deposit an amount 
equivalent to 5% of the loan value in a savings account. The scheme was terminated in 1979 
because it was costly to administer, especially since its branch offices were at that time ill-
equipped to manage funds. These deposits also represented an expensive source of funds 
compared to alternatives then, with interest rates of 9% paid on deposit balances.  
 
Only since the mid-1980s, BAAC has recognized the importance of  voluntary savings 
mobilization, not only from its own perspective of deposits as a stable and reliable source of 
funds but also from the viewpoint of its farmer clients who need safe, liquid and convenient 
deposit facilities. The bank realized that there is a strong demand for deposit facilities 
especially among farm households who are forced to synchronize income and expenditure in 
the course of the agricultural production cycle. Furthermore, savings act as a buffer against 
the uncertainty which  governs the rural economy. In the wake of unforeseen events and 
emergencies,  financial savings perform a basic insurance function. Reports from the field 
officers revealed that farm households came to BAAC for credit services but they would 
choose the Government Savings Bank or the commercial banks for depositing their savings. 
 
Over the past decade, the bank has campaigned vigorously to mobilize rural savings. The 
Savings Promotion Division was set up in the head office and assigned the task to develop 
strategies and design appropriate savings products. The branches were instructed to set 
annual mobilization targets, and savings mobilization became one of the major criteria for 
evaluating branch performance. As a result, BAAC has achieved a remarkable success in 
deposit mobilization. Deposits from the general public grew at annual rates of more than 30% 
and increased from only Baht 7 billion in 1986 to almost Baht 180 billion in March 2000. 
 
  
Design of demand-oriented savings products 
 
BAAC offers a range of savings products aimed at different target groups and with different 
liquidity/yield combinations, as illustrated in Table below. The standard instruments are the 
normal savings passbook on the one hand and fixed deposits for three, six and twelve months 
on the other hand. Normal savings carry an interest rate of 5% while fixed deposits are 
generally higher-yielding, e.g. at 10% to 12% in 1998. The interest rates on both types of 
products closely follow the market rates of commercial banks.  
 
Table 8:  Product mix according to target group, liquidity and yield 
 
Product  Target Group  Liquidity  relative yield 
1. Normal Savings (Tamada)  small savers   high  low 
2. Lucky savings (Thawi Choke)  small savers  high  low/+ lucky draw 
3. Special Savings (Piset)  medium to large  limited  medium/high 
4. Savings bond (Thawi Sin)  middle-class/urban  low/limited  very low/+ lucky draw 
5. Fixed Deposits  middle-class/urban  low  medium  
Source: Maurer (1998) 
 
 
In addition, BAAC offers a Special Savings facility which requires a minimum balance of Baht 
10,000 and therefore addresses the more well-to-do customers. Interest rates are highly 
attractive (9.5% to 11% in 1998) and comparable to fixed deposit rates. The liquidity of this 
facility is limited as depositors may withdraw only once a month. However, the attractive 
feature of this product is that interest income is exempted from taxation. Only government-
owned banks including BAAC are entitled to offer this kind of facility which provides them with 
a comparative edge over private commercial banks. 
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In 1995, BAAC introduced an innovative savings product primarily targeted to the low-income 
market called Om Sap Thawi Ckoke or Lucky Savings. This product was developed by BAAC 
Savings Mobilization Division together with GTZ's Micro-finance Linkage Project. The 
minimum opening deposit is only Baht 50 (US$ 1,25) and, although the interest rate of 4% 
paid on deposits is one percentage point below the standard rate BAAC pays for savings 
accounts, the account owner is entitled to participate in regular semi-annual lotteries offering 
goods popular in rural areas as prizes. After successful pilot-testing in selected branches, the 
product has been launched nationwide in early 1996 and has so far attracted 1.6 million 
depositors.  
 
The most recent product introduced in 1997 in with the objective of attracting long-term funds 
is the BAAC Savings Bond (Thawi Sin). The savings bonds have a nominal value of Baht 500 
(US$ 12.50) each and a term of five years. The five-year bonds carry an interest rate of only 
2% p.a. but - as a compensation for the low yield - the bondholders participate in a highly 
publicized lottery at national level.  
 
More than two thirds of BAAC’s deposits are generated through the various kinds of savings 
products while fixed deposits accounted for less than a third at the end of FY 1998. 
 
Individual and institutional depositors 
 
Depositors are broadly classified into (a) private individuals and (b) institutions. As can be 
seen in Table below, individuals accounted for the major share (60%) while institutions held 
40% of total deposits in March 1999.  
 
Institutional depositors include primarily provincial and district government offices and line 
agencies and, to a smaller extent, agricultural cooperatives and farmers’ associations. BAAC 
has benefited from the regulation that local government offices must keep their budget funds 
in an account with a government-owned bank. Branch managers have been lobbying 
intensively to attract these funds. Institutional deposits are made up of a  relatively small 
number of accounts with large amounts. They are held in both savings and fixed deposits on 
an almost equal balance. Furthermore, institutional deposit accounts are subject to 
considerable fluctuations depending on budget allocations and expenditures which exposes 
the bank to a considerable liquidity risk. The branches suffered from massive withdrawals of 
funds during the year of crisis 1997/98 when austerity measures were imposed under the 
auspices of the IMF.  
 
Table 9:  Volume of deposits by type and source (March 1999) 
 
  Savings Deposits  Fixed Deposits  Sub-total 
Private individuals  47%  13%  60% 
Institutions  21%  19%  40% 
Sub-total  68%  32%  100% 
 
 
Deposits from individuals generally have been much more stable. Almost 70% of deposits 
from private individuals were held in simple savings accounts, a pattern which is typical for 
rural customers. As of March 1999, almost half (47%) of all deposits originated from individual 
savings accounts. In the past, this source has been the most stable and dynamic segment of 
BAAC’s deposit market. The number of savings accounts increased from 4.1 million in 1994 
to 8.3 million in 1999 (see Table 10 below), adding about one million savings accounts every 
year. 
 
The size distribution of savings accounts by number and volume reveals a considerable 
concentration. The vast majority (98%) of the savings accounts record a balance of less than  
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Baht 50,000 (US$ 1,250). This may indicate that the majority of BAAC’s depositors belong to 
the lower-income brackets. However, these accounts generate only 26% of the deposit 
volume while a few large depositors (8,391 clients or 0.1% in 1999) account for 31% of the 
volume. This concentration has increased during the past two years of the financial crisis 
indicating that a number of investors have resorted to BAAC as a safe haven. This trend has 
further accelerated well into 1999 and has left BAAC awash with liquidity. As these funds are 
highly volatile, the liquidity risk from sudden withdrawals are considerable.  
 
Table 10:  Size distribution of savings deposits from private individuals 
 
End of FY  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 1999 
           
Number of accounts  4,148,041  4,397,091  5,561,608  6,665,798  7,576,935 8,297,844 
of which:           
1 – 5,000  83%  82%  84%  85%  86% 86% 
5,001 – 50,000  14%  16%  14%  12%  12% 11% 
50,001 – 100,000  1%  1%  1%  1%  1% 1% 
100,001 – 500,000  1%  1%  1%  1%  1% 1% 
500,001 – 1,000,000  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1% 0.1% 
1,000,001 +  0.0%  0.1%  0.1%  0.2%  0.1% 0.1% 
           
           
Volume (Baht billion)  23.8  34.2  43.8  56.9  74.5 78.2 
of which:           
1 - 5,000  10%  9%  10%  9%  8% 8% 
5,001 – 50,000  30%  29%  26%  21%  17% 18% 
50,001 – 100,000  13%  12%  11%  10%  9% 9% 
100,001 – 500,000  24%  23%  24%  25%  23% 25% 
500,001 – 1,000,000  7%  6%  7%  7%  7% 9% 
1,000,001 +  17%  21%  22%  29%  36% 31% 
           
Average balance (Baht)  5,736  7,786  7,871  8,530  9,830 9,421 
           
Source: BAAC. Savings Promotion Division. 
 
 
4.3  Other services 
 
BAAC provides a range of complementary services specifically designed to the needs of rural 
low-income clients. Since 1988, BAAC has supported the establishment and operations of 
agricultural marketing cooperatives (AMC). Their main function has been the supply of quality 
farm inputs to farmers. The cooperatives’ offices and warehouses are housed in the 
premises of BAAC branches. 
 
Another innovative feature is the provision of basic insurance services to rural customers. To 
this end, BAAC has initiated the establishment of funeral associations among its clients which 
provide financial assistance to the member’s family in case of death. BAAC has adopted the 
system from small indigenous funeral societies which are still found in the villages. With the 
administrative support from BAAC officers, the BAAC associations can accept a few 
thousand members and thus take advantage of economies of scale and scope. 
 





The results in client outreach have been impressive. With the expansion of the branch 
network since 1988, the number of borrowers has doubled. Today, 5 million farm households 
are registered as BAAC clients (see Table 11).
9 This represents about 88% of the total farm 
households in Thailand. The extent of this outreach is unique in Asia and in the developing 
world as a whole. 
 
Table 11:  Borrower Client Outreach (registered clients in millions) 
 
End of financial year  1986  1990  1994  1998 
         
Direct farmer clients (Members of Joint Liability Groups)  1.5  2.1  3.1  3.5 
Members of Cooperatives and Farmers’ Associations  0.9  1.0  1.3  1.5 
TOTAL  2.4  3.1  4.3  5.0 
         




The outreach to depositors is equally impressive. Although BAAC has no data on the actual 
number of depositors, the number of 7.6 million in 1998 savings accounts may provide 
sufficient proof. In addition, BAAC’s market share in rural deposits (outside metropolitan 
Bangkok) has grown significantly in recent years to more than 14% (see Table 12). A decade 
ago, this share was still less than 3%
10. 
 
Table 12:  Market shares in rural deposits 
 
  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Commercial Banks  70%  68%  59%  57% 
Gov. Savings Bank  18%  19%  25%  26% 
BAAC  9%  11%  13%  14% 
Gov. Housing Bank     2%     2%     3%     3% 





The average loan size may serve as a first proxy for outreach quality. In 1998, the average 
loan size was Baht 81,696 (US$ 2,042). Taking the average per capita income of US$  in 
Thailand as a reference, the average loan size indicates BAAC’s orientation to the low-income 
smallholder target group. This finding is confirmed when the size distribution of loans is taken 
into account. Around 98% of all loans and about 80% of the loan volume are in the micro and 
small categories while medium and large loans together account for 2% of the number and 
about 20% of the loan volume.  
 
From 1995 onwards, the share of micro loans below Baht 60,000 has declined from 78% to 
59% with a corresponding increase in small loans. To some extent, this development reflects 
a graduation of clients who require larger loans. To the other extent, this trend shows a 
supply-side reaction to the political interference in 1995 when BAAC was forced to reduce the 
lending rate for micro loans to below cost-covering levels. As a consequence, BAAC has - 
                                                                 
9  Not all of the registered clients are current borrowers. For example, in direct lending to farmer clients the 
number of actual borrowers has been relatively constant at 2.2 million or 65% of the registered clients over the 
past five years. 
10  GTZ (1999), p. 91  
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understandably - reduced its exposure in this category to less than 60% in numbers and to 
less than 20% in the loan amount. 
 
Table 13:  Size distribution of direct loans to farmer clients 
 
  Loan size (Baht)  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Number of loans           
Micro   below 60,000  78%  67%  62%  59% 
Small   60,001 - 100,000  11%  18%  21%  22% 
  100,001 - 500,000  10%  14%  16%  17% 
Medium  500,001 - 1,000,000  0.8%  1.2%  1.3%  1.5% 
Large  above 1,000,000  0.2%  0.4%  0.4%  0.5% 
           
Loan Amount           
Micro   below 60,000  38%  26%  23%  19% 
Small   60,001 - 100,000  13%  16%  17%  28% 
  100,001 - 500,000  35%  38%  39%  34% 
Medium  500,001 - 1,000,000  9%  11%  11%  10% 
Large  above 1,000,000  7%  9%  10%  9% 
           
Average loan size  Baht  50,293  62,104  66,513  81,696 
 
 
Micro loans below Baht 60,000 are secured by joint liability, i.e. through co-signing of at least 
two members of the joint liability group. Micro loans do not require collateral. This policy 
enables poorer clients who do not posses adequate collateral to avail loans for agricultural 
production.  
 
Furthermore, the regional distribution of BAAC’s services serves as a clear indication of 
poverty outreach. The Northern and the Northeastern Region, Thailand’s poorest regions, 
have benefited from a significant share of BAAC’s credit services. 70% of BAAC’s clients are 
located in these regions and receive about 60% of the credit supplied by BAAC. 
 
5. Sources of funds: From dependence to self-reliance through savings mobilization 
5.1  Restructuring in the sources of funds 
 
One of the core elements of BAAC’s reform process has been the fundamental restructuring 
in the sources of funds. The restructuring of the liability side progressed in stages over a 
period of 30 years and basically followed the phases outlined in chapter II above.  
 
Table 14:  Change in BAAC’s sources of funds structure 1967 to 1999 
 
  1967  1973  1980  1987  1993  1998  1999 
Deposits from the public  11%  17%  12%  25%  48%  62%  65% 
Mandatory deposits from CBs  --  --  39%  39%  7%  1%  -- 
Borrowings  19%  22%  35%  29%  32%  25%  22% 
Shareholders’ Equity  66%  57%  12%  6%  8%  7%  8% 
Other liabilities  4%  4%  2%  1%  5%  5%  5% 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
               
Deposits to loans  14%  19%  21%  38%  66%  80%  81% 




In the first phase (1966 - 1974), BAAC operated almost exclusively with government funds 
The major share (about 60%) came as equity contribution and some minor share (about 
20%) in the form of a special credit facility on preferential terms from the BoT. 
 
During the second phase (1975 - 1987), mandatory deposits from commercial banks became 
the major source of funds (about 40%), following the agricultural credit policy issued in 1975. 
At the same time, BAAC started borrowing from international finance agencies which made 
this source the second most important (about 30%) in the 1980s. Finally, deposit mobilization 
from the general public started to gain importance towards the end of the phase. In 1987, 
deposits mobilized by BAAC already accounted for one fourth of BAAC’s funds. The build-up 
of liabilities (deposits and borrowings) significantly raised the financial leverage as the equity 
ratio came down from almost 60% in the beginning to 6% at the end of the phase. 
 
The third phase (1988 - 1996) brought another major change in the funding structure. During 
the period, BAAC made deposit mobilization a core activity of its banking operations and as a 
result, deposits mainly from the rural areas have evolved into the single most important 
source of funds (more than 60%). Due to the liberalization of the agricultural credit policy, the 
commercial banks drew down their mandatory deposits with BAAC to an insignificant volume 
which provided a major impetus to BAAC’s mobilization efforts. While borrowings have 
remained the second major source (about 25%), the composition has changed. BAAC had 
suffered considerable losses from exchange rate fluctuations associated with foreign loans 
and, thus, has taken a more cautious stance towards borrowings from abroad.  
 
In 1991, BAAC started to issue bonds in the local capital market. The placement was 
successful and further issues followed annually. Today, local-currency bonds account for 
roughly half of BAAC’s borrowings, soft loans from international finance agencies between 
25% and 30% and the remaining balance of 20% comprises borrowing from domestic banks 
including the BoT (see Table 15 below). Government funds have been reduced to an 
insignificant share. Only in 1997 when Thailand was hit by the severe financial crisis, BAAC 
had to resort to the Ministry of Finance for liquidity credit which was converted into equity in 
the following year. In 1998, the bulk of overseas loans originated from OECF Japan (67%) and 
the Asian Development Bank (23%) while the balance (10%) was shared by a number of 
finance agencies including IFAD.  
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Table 15:  Composition of borrowings by source 
 
Baht million  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
           
1. Overseas loans           
•  OECF Japan  7,562  8,337  11,212  12,541  15,627 
•  World Bank  2.000  1,805  1,450  1,724  1,377 
•  Asian Development Bank  48  41  969  4,329  5,490 
•  KfW Germany  441  426  388  530  515 
•  IFAD  177  329  271  327  257 
•  USAID  150  145  75  107  98 
•  FMO Netherlands  93  78  71  57  43 
•  Meiji Mutual Life Insurance 
Company 
--  --  1,052  1,486  -- 
Sub-total  10.471  11.161  15.488  21.101  23.407 
           
2. BAAC Bonds  20,000  23,000  26,000  29,000  29,000 
3. Local Banks  2,500  3,759  7,498  15,648  10,600 
4. Bank of Thailand  4,650  4,125  3,500  4,000  4,000 
3. Government  147  140  189  9.807  150 
           
T O T A L   37,768  42,185  52,675  79,555  67,157 
T O T A L (% of total assets)   28.6%  25.9%  25.5%  33.8%  25.3% 
      Source: BAAC  
 
 
Over the past ten years, BAAC has increasingly become financially self-reliant and was able 
to significantly reduce its dependence on government funds, mandatory deposits from the 
commercial banks and loans from domestic and foreign sources. Within only a decade, the 
deposit to loan ratio more than doubled to 83%. 
 
5.2  Asset and liability management  
 
BAAC’s  liquidity situation has been maintained at comfortable levels since the bank gained 
access to deposits and foreign loans after 1975. BAAC has traditionally acquired more 
liabilities, i.e. deposits and borrowings, than were required to refinance its loan portfolio. The 
excess funds were invested in the local money and capital markets. These financial 
investments have generated additional interest income which has been used to boost its 
profitability and/or to compensate for losses from its lending operations. From 1986 to 1991, 
the proportion of excess funds was in the range of 22% to 30% (see Table 16) and came 
down to below 10% in the following years. With the significant inflow of deposits from private 
investors resorting to BAAC as a safe haven in the wake of the financial crisis, BAAC has 
been awash with liquidity in the past two years. 
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Table 16:  Matching of assets and liabilities 
 










(1 ./. 2) 
Excess funds 
as % of (1) 
1986  32.4  24.3  8.1  25% 
1987  32.5  23.4  9.1  28% 
1988  35.9  25.3  10.6  30% 
1989  43.0  31.1  11.9  28% 
1990  59.2  39.1  11.0  22% 
1991  65.5  51.0  14.5  22% 
1992  75.3  69.9  5.4  7% 
1993  94.4  79.6  14.8  16% 
1994  114.2  102.4  11.8  10% 
1995  140.6  134.5  6.1  4% 
1996  183.0  172.0  11.0  6% 
1997  215.4  185.8  29.6  14% 
1998  234.2  198.4  35.8  15% 
 
 
BAAC has maintained a relatively balanced term structure of assets and liabilities. For 
refinancing its long-term loans to clients, the bank has resorted to long-term borrowing from 
foreign sources which has helped BAAC to expand the proportion of investment loans since 
the early 1980s. Medium-term loans are mainly funded by domestic borrowing and bonds 
while customer deposits - the bulk of which are withdrawable at any time - are to a large 
extent employed in seasonal lending. As the term structure in Table 17 illustrates, deposits 
are also used to compensate for the mismatch in the long- and medium-term positions. This 
clearly indicates that BAAC increasingly performs as a financial intermediary by conducting 
term transformation to a considerable extent and, thus, improving financial intermediation 
efficiency. 
 
Table 17:  Term structure of assets and liabilities 1998 (billion Baht) 
 
  Net Loans  Liabilities  Deficit/surplus 
short-term  86  167  + 81 
Medium-term  59  37  - 22 
long-term  53  30  - 23 
Total  198  234  + 36 
      Source: own calculations and estimates on the basis of BAAC data 
 
6. Financial performance: From subsidy dependence to increasing financial self-
sustainability 
 
6.1  Capital adequacy 
 
The ratio of capital to loan portfolio was high during the initial phase of BAAC’s operations 
because equity contributions from the government constituted the major source of funds at 
that time. With the diversification of funds, the ratio gradually declined from 75% in 1967 to 
less than 10% in the late 1990s. During the phase of rapid expansion from 1988 until 1995, 
BAAC maintained its capital endowment at between 10% and 13% of loans outstanding, a 
level considered acceptable for a sound rural financial institution.   
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Table 18:  Capital base 
 
  1967  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  1997  1999 
Shareholder capital 





















Since 1995, the ratio has dropped below 10%. The most serious decline occurred in the 
context of the financial crisis in 1997. BAAC experienced a considerable loss of Baht 5.6 
million (equivalent to US$ 223 million at pre-crisis exchange rate) due to the devaluation of the 
Thai currency. The bulk of its foreign debt was unhedged at the time. The deferred loss 
effectively wiped out almost half of BAAC’s equity. In 1998, the government replenished 
BAAC’s capital to an adequate level.  
 
6.2  Portfolio quality and loan loss provisions 
 
Portfolio quality was low in the mid-1980s but has improved considerably since then.
11 BAAC 
has maintained an adequate reserve for doubtful and bad loans in accordance with loan 
portfolio quality (see Table 19). With improving portfolio quality, the reserve declined from 
more than 7% of gross loans outstanding in the late 1980s to less than 3% in the mid-1990s. 
In most years, BAAC maintained the reserve at roughly twice the level of arrears of more than 
one year. Over the past three years, the ratio of reserves to arrears has declined and for 1998 
an 1999 the reserves appear to be inadequate against the dramatic increase in arrears. 
 
Table 19:  Reserve for bad debt 
 
  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
billion Baht:                       
Gross loans outstanding  33.6  41.9  54.0  73.2  83.3  106.2  138.2  177.1  193.5  209.4  228.5 
./. Reserve for bad debt  2.5  2.8  3.0  3.3  3.7  3.8  3.6  5.1  7.7  11.0  15.1 
Net loans outstanding  31.1  39.1  51.0  69.9  79.6  102.4  134.5  172.0  185.8  198.4  213.4 
                       
% of loans outstanding:                       
Reserve for bad debt  7.4%  6.7%  5.5%  4.5%  4.5%  3.5%  2.6%  2.9%  4.0%  5.2%  6.6% 
Arrears of more than 1 
year  























Source: BAAC. Annual Reports. 
 
 
In the past, annual provisions were made on the basis of past due principal according to age. 
New provisioning rules are currently worked out by BAAC and the BoT which will be based on 
portfolio at risk and brought in line with prudential standards applied the commercial banks. 
This measure alone is likely to require a considerable increase in provisions in the near future 
let alone the further deterioration of the loan portfolio. 
 
 
6.3  Profitability 
 
                                                                 
11  On recovery performance see section 4.1  
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BAAC has generated positive returns of assets and equity in all of its 33 years of operations. 
However, since 1975, the level of profitability has been low with a return on assets (ROA) of 
less than 1%. In the first phase, profitability was much higher because BAAC was provided 
with cheap and costless funds by the government. A sharp decrease in profitability occurred 
from 1975 to 1977 because of the higher financial costs of mandatory deposits from the 
commercial banks. Lending rates, on the other hand, were kept low due to political pressure. 
A reduction in operational costs and access to soft loans from foreign sources led to an 
improvement in profitability. 
 
The official and certified financial statements published in the annual reports do not fully 
reflect the true picture. Firstly, the annual bonus for directors and employees are presented 
erroneously as appropriation of profit and not as an expense in compliance with international 
accounting standards. Secondly, the financial statements - though being valid for BAAC as an 
entity -  do not show the profitability of BAAC’s main activity, i.e. lending, but they are masked 
by a considerable degree of cross-subsidization by interest income from investments in 
government bonds. Therefore, adjustments have been made accordingly in the profit and loss 
data presented in Table 20 below for the past ten years.  
 
Table 20:  Development of profit and loss 1989 to 1999 
(% of average gross loans outstanding) 
 
  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
                       
1. Income from lending  12.6%  13.1%  13.2%  12.0%  12.6%  11.0%  11.6%  11.2%  12.1%  12.3%  10.4% 
2. Cost of (loanable) funds  7.5%  9.0%  8.6%  7.1%  6.9%  6.5%  7.7%  7.0%  7.3%  7.1%  5.2% 
3. Spread (1./.2)  5.1%  4.1%  4.6%  4.8%  5.8%  4.4%  3.9%  4.2%  4.8%  5.2%  5.2% 
                       
4a. Personnel (incl. 
bonus) 
3.0%  3.1%  2.8%  2.8%  2.7%  2.6%  2.6%  2.2%  2.3%  2.1%  1.9% 
4b. Office cost  1.2%  1.1%  1.2%  1.0%  1.7%  1.4%  1.2%  1.1%  1.0%  1.0%  0.9% 
4c. Loan loss provisions  0.9%  0.9%  0.4%  0.7%  0.6%  0.0%  0.4%  1.0%  1.5%  2.4%  2.6% 
4. Total operational cost  5.1%  5.0%  4.4%  4.5%  5.0%  4.1%  4.2%  4.4%  4.8%  5.4%  5.4% 
                       
5. Net income from 
lending (3./.4) 
-0.1%  -0.9%  0.2%  0.3%  0.8%  0.3%  -0.3%  -0.1%  0.0%  -0.2%  -0.2% 
                       
6. Net income from 
investments  
1.0%  1.6%  0.3%  0.4%  0.0%  0.5%  0.6%  0.6%  0.2%  0.2%  0.2% 
                       
7. Profit (5+6)  0.9%  0.7%  0.6%  0.8%  0.8%  0.8%  0.3%  0.4%  0.2%  0.0%  0.0% 
                       
Profitability ratios:                       
Return of Assets (ROA)  0.6%  0.5%  0.4%  0.6%  0.6%  0.7%  0.3%  0.4%  0.2%  0.0%  0.0% 
Return on Equity (ROE)  7.5%  5.6%  5.0%  8.0%  8.3%  8.7%  3.9%  5.6%  4.3%  0.2%  0.2% 
                       
Sustainability ratios:                       
Operation. Self-sufficiency  245%  260%  302%  266%  255%  267%  279%  256%  254%  226%   
Financial self-sufficiency  99%  94%  102%  103%  107%  103%  98%  99%  100%  98%   
Source: BAAC annual reports; own calculations and adjustments 
 
 
The adjusted income statements alter the picture somewhat. It shows that BAAC suffered a 
loss on its lending operations in five out of ten years. Net income from lending (line 5) declined 
dramatically in 1990 due to an increase in the cost of funds following the liberalization and rise 
of deposit rates in 1989. On the other hand, BAAC benefited from higher interest rates and 
compensated the loss from lending with profits from its investments. With cost of funds 
retreating to normal levels, BAAC returned to profitability in lending operations from 1991 to 
1995. However, since 1996 profitability deteriorated. On the one hand, this was a result of the  
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intervention by the government which forced BAAC to reduce the lending rate on micro loans 
to 9%. On the other hand, the bank faced a decline in loan recovery and higher provisions for 
non-performing loans. The financial crisis which hit Thailand in 1997 led to a further erosion in 
loan portfolio quality in the past two years. 
 
Throughout the years, BAAC was able to cross-subsidize its lending business with interest 
income from investments (line 6) and maintain its overall profitability. However, with increased 
market integration on the funding side (deposits) the margin has narrowed considerably over 
the last four years. In 1998, BAAC as a whole was barely able to break-even. Amid the excess 
liquidity in the banking system and the low yields on its investments, BAAC cannot count on 
cross-subsidies anymore but must rather address the root causes undermining the 
profitability of its lending operations. 
 
BAAC’s operational costs (line 4) have moved in a narrow range between 4% and 5%. This 
span appears relatively efficient given the nature of BAAC’s operations with millions of small 
loans and deposits which inherently have high administration costs. Cost control and 
reduction have always been a priority concern for BAAC’s management. Over the past 
decade, staff expenses were reduced from 3.1% to 1.9% i ndicating significant gains in 
productivity (see section 6.4 below). Office cost was brought down to 1% of average loans 
outstanding. The decline in these cost aggregates is mirrored, however, by a deterioration of 
recovery performance and a resulting increase in loan loss provisions to the highest level in 
BAAC’s history. In 1999, loan loss provisions accounted for 2.6% of average loans 
outstanding, more than the total staff expenses in the same year. Provisions for loan losses 
are likely to increase significantly as BAAC is required to apply more stringent provisioning 
rules set by the Bank of Thailand.  
 
Besides the current recovery problem, the root cause for BAAC’s precarious financial 
situation is rather to be sought in the political restriction on its lending rates. The cap on 
lending rates leaves BAAC with a narrow spread of 4% to 5% which has been more or less 
sufficient for the bank to cover the costs. On the one hand, this policy has in principle ensured 
the viability of BAAC’s operations. On the o ther hand, it has prevented BAAC from 
strengthening its capital base through retained earnings and from providing its shareholders 
with attractive dividends. The latter is of particular importance in the light of BAAC’s 
privatization plans. The return on equity (ROE) has been low and in some years even below 
the rate of inflation. 
 
Furthermore, BAAC has benefited from various types of hidden incentives and indirect 
subsidies which have not been accounted for in the calculation  presented above, such as 
exemption from minimum reserve requirements and income tax, costless equity from the 
government and preferential interest on BoT borrowings. Attempts have been made by the 
World Bank to quantify the  subsidy dependence of BAAC by incorporating the various 
subsidy elements in the calculation of the so-called subsidy dependence index
12. The 
computation revealed no clear declining trend in BAAC’s subsidy dependence during the 
period from 1987 to 1995 but showed a positive correlation of subsidy dependence and 
inflation. A plausible explanation for this trend is that BAAC has had to pay competitive rates 
on deposits when inflation has risen, but it has been unable to adjust its lending rates 
sufficiently upwards due to political pressure. In contrast, declining inflation rates have 
improved BAAC’s operating margins and consequently enabled it to cover a larger share of its 
costs and lower its dependence on subsidies. In 1995, for example, BAAC could have 
eliminated subsidies by an increase in the average lending rate by 3.9 percentage points.
 13    
 
                                                                 
12  Assessing Development Finance Institutions - A Public Interest Analysis. By Jacob Yaron, World Bank 
Discussion Paper 174 (1992) 
13  Over the past decade, BAAC‘s subsidy dependence index oscillated within a modest range of 10 to 55 
percent, in 1995it was 35.4%. See SBP (1998), pp. 25-26  
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The challenge for BAAC is to convince the government that serving millions of small 
customers in rural areas is a costly business, unlike commercial banking in primarily urban 
areas which policy-makers as a reference. The scale and scope of BAAC operations 
therefore require a realistic pricing of loans. In July 1999, the BAAC Board approved an 
important step towards reforming the bank’s interest rate policy. The progressive interest rate 
structure (see Table 5) and the inherent cross-subsidies were abolished and replaced by a 
unanimous base rate of 12.5% irrespective of the loan size. Furthermore, the interest rate is 
linked to performance, i.e. preferential rates may be applied for borrowers with good 
performance and track record (prime customers). Being a step in the right direction, the 
incentive effects on the recovery performance and the overall impact on the profitability are 
yet to be seen.  
 
6.4  Efficiency and productivity 
 
The successive increases in efficiency and productivity have been key factors for BAAC’s 
survival and (constrained) profitability in the past. The increase of staff has closely followed 
the growth in output, especially with number of client farmers registered.  
 
The productivity of the credit officers has increased successively over the years. Today, one 
credit officer is responsible for 500 to 550 client farmers, a number which appears high in 
comparison with similar financial institutions elsewhere. However, only about 70% of 
registered clients are current borrowers so that a credit officer handles about 400 loans. 
Furthermore, individual client farmers are organized in joint liability groups with an average of 
15 members. As the credit officer primarily deals with the group leader, the credit officer can 
utilize economies of scale and scope as the number of contact persons comes down to 
about 30. The average loan portfolio per credit officer has increased an even faster rate. Over 
the past eight years alone, it more than tripled in nominal terms from Baht 10 million to Baht 
34 million.  
 
Similar productivity increases have taken place in the front- and back-office of the branches. 
With the rapid expansion of savings mobilization, the number of deposit accounts per branch 
employee (excluding credit officers) increased from 836 in 1995 to 1,420 in 1998. Overall, 
BAAC has been remarkably successful in raising staff productivity over the years, at least in 
terms of quantity. Whether the quality of output could simultaneously be sustained or even 
improved is to be questioned, especially in the light of the deterioration in portfolio quality.  
 
Efficiency increases and cost reductions have been the major guiding principles over the past 
years. The continuous decline in administrative cost - combining both staff and office cost - 
since 1993 is clearly visible in Figure 1 below. Simultaneously, however, the cost of risk in the 
form of provisions for loan losses increased at an even faster rate. The opposing trends point 
at a  trade-off between administrative costs and costs of risk: the lower the investment in 
terms of staff and office support for screening, monitoring and follow-up of borrowers, the 
higher are the potential loan losses and the costs associated in the form of loan loss 
provisions. The combination of both cost aggregates is optimal when the total operational 
costs - i.e. the sum of both - are minimized. It appears that BAAC experienced such kind of 
equilibrium from 1989 to 1993 when administrative costs were relatively constant at around 
4% and loan l oss provisions between 0.5% and 1%. The trend since 1994 indicates that 
raising efficiency and productivity beyond this optimum may have been counter-productive as 
risk-related costs have increased to a similar extent. The result has been that overall 
operating costs have risen to 5.4% of average loans outstanding, the highest level BAAC has 














1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Admin. cost Loan loss provisions Total operational cost
 
Source: Table 20  
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
1. General conclusions 
 
In BAAC, the reform process as such has been a gradual one and has progressed in stages 
over more than 30 years, different from the „big-bang“ type of reform experienced in other 
agricultural banks, for example BRI in 1983. At times, the reform process in BAAC moved 
slowly, and gained momentum in other periods. 
 
The implementation of reform steps has resulted from both external and internal factors. In 
many cases, reform decisions and measures were taken in response to external influences 
such as government policy decisions and external shocks like the financial crisis most 
recently. However, a number of important reform steps originated from inside, some in 
adaptation or anticipation of a changing environment, others in response to lessons learned 
including both failures and best practices. The shift from wholesale to retail lending in the late 
1970s and the aggressive expansion of the branch network since the late 1980s are 
examples in point. 
 
The development of BAAC and the inherent reform process have been guided by a clear 
vision of achieving the dual objectives of (a) maximum outreach to the target clientele of farm 
households and (b) maintaining the financial viability of the bank. Political pressure and the 
strong role of the government has been the major force behind the outreach objective while 
the financial viability has been of vital interest to BAAC’s management. Striking a balance 
between the two potentially conflicting objectives has not been an easy task and involved 
compromises and compensations on either side.  
 
In terms of focus and content, the reform process has been directed at the transition from 
agricultural credit to rural finance and at the institutional transformation of BAAC from a 
specialized credit institution to a diversified rural bank. The gradual diversification of financial 
services provides a clear indication of this evolution. In the early years, BAAC mainly provided 
short-term agricultural loans. During the 1980s, the bank expanded into medium- and long-
term farm lending. Since 1993, BAAC has offered loans for farm-related activities and most 
recently opened the window for non-farm lending to rural micro and small enterprises. Since 
the mid-1980s, BAAC has added savings deposit facilities to the range of financial services 
offered to its rural clients. 
 
The progress of BAAC has been achieved under a financial sector policy framework which is 
commonly being criticized as „repressive“ with features such as fixed ceilings on lending 
rates, directed credit, mandated lending to agriculture etc. The agricultural credit policy in the 
1970s and 1980s, and especially the mandatory deposits supplied from the credit quota 
policy, allowed BAAC to expand. Moreover, the availability of these deposits introduced BAAC 
to a more commercially-oriented cost structure which, in turn, forced the issue of cost-
efficiency on the management and staff. This first step into the market prepared BAAC for the 
mobilization of its own deposits at a later stage.  
 
2. Major reform elements 
 
The reform of BAAC was characterized by a number of specific elements which can be 
summarized as follows:  
 
First, the operational autonomy of the bank has been safeguarded and respected by the 
government. Directives and interventions by the government mainly applied to the policy level.   
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Second, BAAC has developed a corporate culture that recognizes cost-effectiveness, 
productivity and efficiency as major guiding principles, despite government ownership and 
BAAC’s status as a state-owned enterprise. This was largely achieved by the „privatization“ of 
the organization and the internal procedures, such as the delegation of authority and 
responsibility to managers at different levels, the organization of the branches as profit 
centers and the recruitment of staff carefully tuned to workload, to name a few examples. 
 
Third, the expansion of the branch network and the decentralization of operations which 
greatly increased the physical proximity and convenience and reduced the transaction costs 
for its clients. This was particularly important for savings mobilization as the number and 
volume of deposits grew proportionately with the number of outlets.  
 
Fourth, BAAC developed and perfected a particular financial technology and delivery 
mechanism, i.e. individual lending to members of joint liability groups, which specifically suits 
the rural Thai context. At the same time, BAAC reduced its engagement in the field which was 
less successful, i.e. wholesale lending to agricultural cooperatives. 
 
Sixth, BAAC actively engaged in rural savings mobilization which led to a radical change in the 
financial resource base. Savings mobilization became a realistic option after two pre-
requisites were fulfilled: first, the loan portfolio quality significantly improved in the early 1990s 
which sent an important signal to depositors concerning the safety of their deposits, and 
second, the expansion of the branch network reduced the depositors’ transaction costs which 
allowed low-income clients to deposit small amounts in a savings account with BAAC. 
 
Seventh, in view of the political constraints in its lending policy, BAAC’s management has 
successfully pursued a strategy of negotiating privileges and compensations against 
government interventions and restrictions. While such compromises represent second-best 
solutions from a strictly economic viewpoint, BAAC was able to protect its financial viability in 
a politically constrained environment. 
 
3. The reform agenda ahead  
 
Despite the achievements and progress so far, some issues remain to be addressed in the 
future. 
 
First, BAAC’s ownership and governance structure does not reflect the composition of 
stakeholders which has radically changed over the past years. Today, more than one half of 
BAAC’s financial resource base originates from private individual depositors who have 
emerged as the major stakeholders. They need to be reassured and protected with respect to 
the safety of the financial resources they have entrusted to BAAC. The recent shift of BAAC 
from government control to regulation and supervision by the BoT has been a first step in this 
direction. Moreover, the diversification of stakeholders should therefore be adequately 
reflected by moving to private ownership of BAAC stock and by representation of the 
stakeholders interests on the BAAC Board.  
 
Second, lending rates should be re-aligned to reflect the true cost. The policy makers should 
be convinced that a spread of 4% to 5% is insufficient given the nature of BAAC’s operations, 
i.e. mobilizing small savings and providing small and micro loans. Commercial banks with 
their higher deposit and loan sizes do not represent an appropriate reference for setting 
lending rates. Moreover, BAAC has raised efficiency and productivity to maximum levels and 




Third, BAAC’s management information system (MIS) has not followed suit with the rapid 
development and the fundamental changes that occurred in recent years. BAAC has already 
decided to revamp the entire system and to design and install a new system from scratch. 
BAAC urgently needs to set up an integrated customer information system which allows field-
level managers to track the performance of both savings and loans of a particular client. 
Furthermore, the bank should define a transparent set of performance indicators and 
standards as key management information base in order to rationalize the present system of 
reporting with numerous overlapping and duplications. 
 
Fourth, BAAC should consider introducing performance-based incentives and remuneration, 
a feature largely non-existent to date. The annual bonus taken from the bank’s profit does not 
fulfill this function as all employees receive the same bonus in proportion to their monthly 
salaries. However, the Board has authorized the management to pilot-test a performance-
based incentive scheme and has allocated a limited amount for this purpose in the current FY 
1999. 
 
4. The role of donors and development cooperation 
BAAC has a long history of cooperation with international donor and finance agencies, both 
financial and technical cooperation. 
 
Since BAAC started to access funds from international finance agencies in the mid-1970s, 
foreign loans have become an important source of loanable funds. However, the experience 
with borrowing abroad has been mixed. On the one hand, the access to long-term funds 
allowed the bank to diversify its term structure on the assets side and expand medium- and 
long-term lending for investment. On the other hand, BAAC was required to assume the 
foreign exchange risk on most of the loans and, as a consequence, suffered considerable 
losses due to exchange rate fluctuations. The losses were particularly severe in the wake of 
the recent financial crisis and the devaluation of the Thai currency when half of the bank’s 
equity was wiped out. Over the past decade, BAAC has been more careful and selective with 
respect to foreign borrowings and has recently adopted a policy that foreign loans should not 
exceed 15% of total assets. 
 
Similarly, BAAC has been a recipient of technical assistance in different fields and from 
various sources. The bank has certainly gained from the inputs and advice provided by 
different experts but also from learning from the  experience of similar institutions in 
neighboring countries. Presently, BAAC has an ongoing cooperation with GTZ of Germany in 
the context of the aforementioned micro-finance linkage project. The project serves as a 
laboratory for developing and testing innovative features, products and approaches in 
selected branches which - if successful - are being replicated on a national scale. So far, the 
project has developed an innovative savings product addressed to low-income clients, a 
training method and program to improve the service culture of BAAC branches as well as the 
system and instruments for non-farm lending to microenterprises    
 
A valuable contribution from international agencies has been provided in the field of political 
advocacy and policy dialogue with government agencies. Institutions like the World Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank but also recognized local institutions like the Thai Development 
Research Institute (TDRI) engaged in research, studies and seminars to support BAAC in its 
struggle for independence and financial self-sustainability. More efforts in this direction are 
needed to remove the remaining barriers on BAAC’s path to becoming a fully autonomous 
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